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FROM DEMESNE TO WORLD-SYSTEM: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
OF THE LITERATURE ON THE TRANSITION FROM 
FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM 
Robert S. DuPlessis 
Although economic history has always been regarded as central 
to the elaboration of a Marxist historiography, relatively 
little of the radical work done in this country has been con-
cerned with it. Many specific reasons help explain this 
phenomenon—the neglect of economic history on the under-
graduate level; the difficulty in obtaining primary sources 
for anything outside American history; the severing of any 
political dimension from the overwhelmingly quantitative 
economic history which is in vogue; the openly reactionary 
political and ideological goals of much of bourgeois economic 
history (like the theory upon which it rests); the (largely 
unconscious) acceptance of the prevailing hierarchy of his-
torical studies. Among younger radical historians, this 
remarkable ignorance of economic history also derives from 
our genesis both as radicals and as historians. For we 
came of age in a period marked not by economic but by po-
litical turmoil—from the Korean War and McCarthyism, through 
civil rights and Vietnam, up to Watergate and its attendant 
crisis of legitimacy—during which the capitalist economic 
structure remained firm and prosperous. The context in which 
we began our work, therefore, did not present us with economic 
problems for which we would be stimulated to find the his-
torical roots. Instead, we encountered political issues, 
and developing an understanding of their origins promised 
not simply greater knowledge in a scholarly sense but also 
the possibility of changing them. Marx's injunction to him-
self and his heirs could best be fulfilled, it seemed, by 
studies of a predominantly political and social cast. 
Recently, however, interest in economic history has been 
growing on the American left, evidence of the maturing of 
Marxist scholarship as well as of the festering depression 
of the past few years. More specifically, a good deal of 
credit must go to Immanuel Wallerstein's The Modern World-
System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the Euro-
pean World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (Academic Press, 
1974) . This book has captured the attention of radicals 
for several reasons. First, it deals with a subject of 
fundamental significance for both modern history and the 
Marxist interpretation of that history, the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. But unlike previous studies of 
the process, which have concentrated on its origins in 
western Europe between the late fourteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Wallerstein's account locates the rise of capi-
talism in its world setting, exploring the ways in which 
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European economic development depended on the subjection and 
exploitation of other areas of the globe. Recognizing more-
over, that there remains substantial disagreement regarding 
the causes of this transformation, Wallerstein carefully sur-
veys many of the important issues, discussing critically a 
wide range of work by bourgeois and Marxist historians alike 
while offering a new framework of analysis for the transition 
and a new interpretation of it. Finally, one of the most 
attractive and persuasive features of The Modern World-System 
is the way Wallerstein places economic history in a political 
context. He sees the evolution of the modern state and the 
growth of capitalism as two sides of the same coin which can 
only be understood if examined together. 
In short, Wallerstein's book is of great importance to a com-
prehension of the transition from feudalism to capitalism— 
even if, as I shall argue below, its thesis is deeply flawed 
and its analyses often wrong. Its significance—and its 
problems—can best be grasped by discussing it in light of 
previous work on the transition. In this review, therefore, 
I shall begin by summarizing the locus classicus, Marx's 
definition of feudalism and capitalism and his scattered and 
even contradictory comments about the causes and character-
istics of the change from one to the other mode of produc-
tion. I shall then turn to later studies and the debate 
which arose concerning the correct interpretation of the 
historical and theoretical material, before concluding with 
a lengthy consideration of The Modern World-System. 
I 
For Marx, feudalism described a society in which a restricted 
aristocracy of landlords ruled a mass of peasants. Because 
the direct producers possessed the means of production, the 
nobility could extract the surplus necessary to its mainte-
nance only by coercion—originally armed force or the threat 
of it, later supplemented by custom, courts and ideological-
religious institutions. The surplus might be rendered by 
labor services on the demesne or by monetary payments; in any 
event, producers were unfree in the sense that they gave 
personal tribute to overlords. The political structure con-
trolled the economic in this mode of production; that is to 
say, relations of political dominance allowed the economic 
surplus to be taken by the non-producing aristocracy. As a 
result both of these coercive relations of production and 
of the fact that the bulk of production was for immediate 
use by the producing and appropriating classes, the forces 
of production remained underdeveloped in feudalism: the 
division of labor was relatively primitive and thus pro-
ductivity was low.l 
5 
Under capitalism, of course, everything is altered. A 
propertyless proletariat works but no longer controls the 
means of production, ownership of which now resides in the 
dominant class of capitalists. Workers can survive only by 
selling their labor power and getting in return a money wage 
with which they must purchase everything they need. The 
economic surplus is appropriated not by forcing producers to 
render service or payments but by paying them less in wages 
than the value in the market of the commodities they make, 
with the difference taken by the capitalist. Hence exchange-
value rather than use-value is the goal of production; even 
labor power has become a commodity which is bought and sold. 
In contrast with feudalism, economic relations are paramount 
throughout society; moreover, they are contractual relations 
without a hint of customary or personal obligation. The ex-
propriation of the direct producers, who as a result must 
constantly enter the market, promotes the development of 
productive forces—an extensive division of labor, much 
greater productivity, technical progress. In this way, de-
mand is created and then supplied in ways which maximize 
capital accumulation in the hands of the capitalist class, 
at the same time that the subordinate condition of the 
proletariat is continually reproduced. 
The utter transformation of the relations and forces of pro-
duction is, of course, the end result of a complex and in-
terdependent series of partial changes. An initial stock of 
capital must be assembled and concentrated in the hands of 
those willing and able to invest it productively, rather 
than consume it. Not only must industry become the most 
important sector of the economy—which entails the super-
cession of the simple (or petty) commodity production of 
handicrafts—but agriculture must improve qualitatively and 
release labor, resources and capital to the industrial sec-
tor. The market has to develop as the instrument of ex-
change, resource allocation and pricing. Both as cause and 
consequence of the above, towns are converted from periph-
eral to central social units, geographical and social mo-
bility increases, and new classes arise and replace the old. 
The structure of law and convention which organized and pro-
tected the previous mode of production must be dismantled 
and replaced. 
These, then, are the historical developments which must be 
explained if we are to understand the transition. Marx, 
himself, however, never elaborated a coherent analysis of 
the internal dynamics of feudalism, nor did he give much of 
an account of the actual events which occurred during the 
transformation. But he did contribute a number of insights 
concerning those material factors which he took to be 
necessary for the collapse of feudalism and the triumph 
of capitalism. Before the well-known section in Volume I 
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of Capital (part VIII on primitive or original accumula-
tion) and the less famous chapters in volume III (ch. XX, 
XXXVI and XLVII)—to which I shall return shortly—Marx had 
written on the subject in The German Ideology and the Grun-
drisse. The relevant passages from the early works, along 
with additional documentation, can be found in the anthology 
Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (International Publishers, 
19 6 5), edited with a fine introduction by Eric Hobsbawm. 
When he first considered the transition, Marx paid little 
attention to the countryside under feudalism. Apparently 
feeling that feudalism was both too strong and too stagnant 
to collapse from within, Marx (as Hobsbawm notes) postulated 
only one task for the rural world, the liberation of its 
residents from the traditional constraints of serfdom and 
personal obligations when they were needed to form capital-
ism's workforce.2 As Marx put it, the conditions obtaining 
under serfdom, when "the laborers themselves, the living 
units of labor power, are still a direct part of the objec-
tive conditions of production and are appropriated as 
such...,"^ must be broken. This differentiation, accom-
plished historically by the flight of serfs into towns, by 
the end of villeinage, and by lords discharging their re-
tainers, gave rise to free labor, that is to say, to labor 
power which its possessors had to sell as a commodity in 
the market. Much later, Engels came to see that the "re-
lations between lords and dependent peasants" under feudal-
ism had strongly affected its evolution, but Engels never 
wrote about the subject in any detail.^ 
For his part, Marx always emphasized the role of the city, 
which he saw as basically external and antagonistic to the 
feudal system. The town was the home of commercial and 
handicraft activities which at one and the same time under-
mined feudalism and created the preconditions for the new 
capitalist mode of production. Engaged in the production 
and exchange of commodities, merchants and craftsmen pro-
moted trade, first local and then over increasingly long 
distances. All of this fostered first, the accumulation 
of monetary wealth; second, the division of labor—between 
town and country (thereby undermining the primacy of landed 
property), among the various types and stages of production, 
between production and commerce, and eventually between 
towns, third, the development of sophisticated market mech-
anisms; and finally, the emergence of the bourgeoisie. Be-
cause its interests could not be realized under feudalism, 
this new class was eager for change; because of its ascend-
ancy over the urban economy, it could effectively discharge 
its mission. Once the restrictions and protections erected 
around simple commodity production by gild and municipal 
authorities could safely be disregarded or even destroyed, 
resources previously acquired through trade, usury, produc-
tion or even hoarding were employed as capital. By means 
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of capital, artisans and peasants were expropriated, free 
labor power purchased, means of production amassed. The 
modern proletariat joined the bourgeoisie as the leading 
social classes, as pre-existing classes were broken down 
and reconstituted. "Capital unites the masses of hands and 
instruments which are already there."5 Without spelling out 
how their effects operated, Marx mentioned "the extension of 
commerce" in the 16th century and the diverse forms of state 
aid usually called mercantilism,6 with the implication that 
both were necessary for the transition to be completed suc-
cessfully. 
These are stimulating propositions, but they remained very 
sketchy in the early works. In Capital, Marx expanded on 
some of them, notably primitive accumulation. He discussed 
both aspects of the process at some length: concentration— 
the amassing of capital in a few hands—and expropriation--
the separation of direct producers from the means of pro-
duction. As in his previous writings, Marx recognized that 
monetary wealth alone could not bring about the transition 
to capitalism (hence merchants were at best proto-capitalists 
as long as they simply made profits by selling scarce goods 
turned out by the existing mode of production); capital had 
to seize hold of production and transform it. Now he sug-
gested that this had happened in two ways. Either merchants 
--the major possessors of capital both under feudalism and 
in conditions of original accumulation--had taken over the 
commercial functions of artisans, thereby subordinating 
them through "putting-out" or the domestic system, and 
eventually turning them into Wage-earners, dispossessed of 
their tools. Or artisans had managed to accumulate a little 
capital, hire workers and branch out into trade, eventually 
building up large workshops. 
This latter way, argued Marx, was the most revolutionary, for 
not only were artisans subordinated to capital, but the en-
trepreneur was stimulated to remake production—combining 
stages, modifying the division of labor, and finally intro-
ducing new technical procedures—all in order to capture 
more of the market. The merchant capitalist, on the con-
trary, was satisfied to leave productive methods largely 
untouched, since his profits came from monopolies a and other 
restrictive means which kept output down and profits per unit 
up. Also in connection with original accumulation, Marx made 
more specific the way in which money had acted as a solvent 
of feudalism in the countryside through the medium of money 
rents. These, which in western Europe had increasingly re-
placed labor services as the Middle Ages drew to a close, 
had hastened the stratification of the populace, enabling 
wealthier and luckier peasants to stockpile resources while 
their hapless neighbors fell behind and were despoiled. 
Thus in country as in city, labor power and the means of 
production became commodities which could be acquired by the 
restricted group which was coincidentally accumulating money 
capital. 
Marx also amplified somewhat his account of the collapse of 
feudalism. In Capital, Vol. I, where he focused on the gath-
ering and deploying of capital, he reiterated his hypothesis 
that since capitalism is a system of commodity production and 
exchange, then trade—the circulation of commodities—must 
have been a crucial factor in breaking down the previous mode 
of production. In particular, the development of the world 
market aided the triumph of capitalism by promoting a wider 
division of labor and manufactures independent of gilds and 
towns. State power, which created a "systematical combina-
tion" of colonies, national debts, taxation, and "mercantil-
ist" systems of protection, also played a role in capitalist 
development. But Marx insisted that force could only "hasten, 
hothouse fashion, the process of transformation...;" it did 
not set the process going in the first place. Later in 
volume III, he qualified this stress, noting that the effects 
of commerce on the feudal order hinged on the nature of that 
order when trade developed. Specifically, feudalism has been 
modified by peasant struggles over the relative share of the 
surplus which they were to retain or the lord was to preempt. 
This never-ending contest did serve to weaken the position 
of the nobility, making it impossible for the old forms of 
surplus appropriation to continue. Yet in the long run it 
proved even more harmful to the mass of the peasantry than 
to the aristocracy. For the replacement of serfdom by 
monetarized relations opened the way for the creation of 
capital and the dissolution of the traditional agrarian com-
munity of petty producers. 
In his brief but pregnant observations, Marx raised the cen-
tral issues regarding the transition from one mode of pro-
duction to another. He laid great weight on the concurrent 
processes of expropriation and concentration which not 
merely eroded the relations of production and appropriation 
obtaining under feudalism but provided some of the critical 
preconditions of capitalism. To account for the change, he 
pointed to the interaction of several new circumstances: 
greatly expanded commercial capital in the hands of an en-
terprising bourgeoisie, the freeing of simple commodity 
production from old restraints so that it might work for and 
be modified by the world market, social polarization and 
class formation, the conduct of the growing central state. 
Notwithstanding the value—heuristic as much as substantive 
—of Marx's comments, like all partial analyses they raised 
as many questions as they answered. This was even more the 
case because what he did write seemed to suggest that 
feudalism required external causes—urban and commercial 
developments—in order to be transformed and he played down 
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the contradictions internal to that mode of production, a 
departure from his usual interpretation of historical change. 
This difficulty may have come from his treatment of feudalism 
as a generally monolithic and static whole, as well as from 
the inadequate empirical studies on which he had to rely. 
Because its inner dynamics were virtually ignored, not only 
were shifts in class relations slighted but the place of towns 
and their craftsmen and merchants within feudalism was viewed 
as considerably more extrinsic than was in fact the case. As 
a further result, the complexity of the transition period and 
its various outcomes was underestimated and the evolution of 
industry inadequately explained. This tendency was reinforced 
by heavy reliance on materials pertaining to England, whose 
experiences during the transition differed quite a bit from 
other nations'. Finally, apart from a few sentences on the 
world market, Marx remained resolutely Euro-centric. In 
short, his suggestions needed to be fleshed out and tested 
in two dimensions, the historical and the theoretical. 
II 
Although some work was done during the intervening decades, 
the first extended Marxist survey and analysis of the tran-
sition problem in the English language was Maurice Dobb's 
Studies in the Development of Capitalism (1946; revised 
edition, 1963). Despite its limitations, which I shall 
address presently, the book has stood the test of time 
remarkably well and can still be recommended as the best 
introduction to the topic. Like Marx, Dobb concentrated 
on England, with some attention devoted to France and the 
Low Countries. Nonetheless, he read widely and critically 
in the existing literature and consciously raised thorny 
problems of interpretation even when the answers he fur-
nished were less than satisfactory. 
Dobb defined feudalism as a mode of production "virtually 
identical" with serfdom: "an obligation laid on the pro-
ducer by force and independently of his own volition to 
fulfill certain economic demands of an overlord."8 It dif-
fered from slavery in that the direct producer was "in 
possession" of the means of production, and from capital-
ism in that s/he was not free in relations with the em-
ployer. 
Taking a hint from Marx's statement that "what new mode of 
production will take the place of the old does not depend 
on commerce but on the character of the old mode of *pro-
duction itself,"9 Dobb broke new ground in explaining the 
eventual decay of feudalism. In contrast to those who 
held that trade was the major solvent of the old order— 
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a position which, as we have seen, can be traced right back 
to Marx's writings—Dobb showed that the growth of commerce 
and the consequent emergence of an economy based on money 
frequently led to harsher rather than decadent serfdom; that 
commodities could easily be produced for sale in the market 
by other types of labor than wage-labor; and that the diver-
gent outcomes cannot be understood only by reference to 
external factors like trade. In other words, the decline 
of feudalism—like change in or from every other mode of 
production—had to be accounted for primarily by contradic-
tions internal to it. And for Dobb, the central contradic-
tion of feudalism lay in its "inefficiency ... as a system 
of production, coupled with the growing needs of the ruling 
class for revenue ... [which] promoted an increase in the 
pressure on the producer to a point where this pressure 
became literally unendurable" (p. 42). 
The questions naturally arise, why did the ruling class 
require more income and why could these demands no longer 
be met? Dobb suggests growth in the numbers and expendi-
tures of lords and vassals, coupled with an increase in 
war and brigandage. While such impositions could initially 
be met by demographic growth among the producers and by the 
opening of new land, this was no longer possible when after 
1300 population declined drastically, largely due to ex-
haustion induced by ever-rising exactions. Crisis and 
revolt ensued throughout Europe. 
By pointing to the contradiction set up between inherently 
coercive relations of production and changing forms and de-
grees of exploitation, Dobb contributed substantially to our 
understanding of the evolution and history of feudalism it-
self. He also clarified the origins of the breakdown of 
this mode of production by showing that Europe passed through 
a sustained crisis during the 14th and 15th centuries—that 
is to say, before the world market had any impact. Besides, 
he recognized that the results of this experience were ex-
tremely varied, and he constructed a brief typology of 
agrarian development. Eastern European lords, he observed, 
succeeded in reintroducing serfdom in order to obtain suf-
ficient labor to work their estates, but in the west im-
pressive concessions which struck at the foundations of 
feudalism (commutation of labor services into money pay-
ments, lightening of all obligations) had to be granted to 
the peasantry in return for their staying on the land. 
What factors accounted for the different effects of the same 
general economic forces? While continuing to insist on the 
primacy of internal causes, Dobb explicitly rejected all 
claims for the primacy of politics. To be sure, peasant 
resistance,aristocratic power and royal authority influ-
enced the upshot of the crisis, which was fought out largely 
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in political terms and in the political arena. The basic 
causes were, however, economic: the existing type of culti-
vation (labor-intensive arable or pasture) and, more impor-
tant still, the abundance or scarcity—and thus cheapness 
or dearness--of hired labor. Lately, the first proposition 
has been getting a good deal of attention, particularly as 
it refers to the early period of capitalism,10
 and it is 
becoming accepted that types of cultivation, rooted in the 
physical geography of different regions, at least estab-
lished limits to the range of possible evolution. The 
specific agrarian structure arrived at in any given locality 
was, nevertheless, by no means determined by physical cir-
cumstances; they created potentialities not certainties. 
The second, and in Dobb's eyes more weighty, explanation 
is somewhat surprising to encounter in his book. On the 
one hand, it assumes the existence of a well-developed labor 
market, an unlikely feature of a feudal economy defined by 
an extensive web of coercive social relations and controls 
on producers; on the other, it minimizes the role of human 
agents in favor of the operation of an impersonal mechanism. 
Following Marx's example, Dobb devoted a large part of the 
Studies to the roles of commerce and towns (as the home of 
merchants and craftsmen) in the transition. Here three 
stages of development can be distinguished: 1) when towns 
began to grow in size, wealth and complexity without al-
tering the feudal mode of production; 2) when changes inside 
towns promoted the emergence of proto-capitalist forms; 
3) when the nascent bourgeoisie took control of and trans-
formed production. In the first period, urban markets were 
still "half servants of and half parasites upon the body of 
feudal economy" (p. 71)—fostering the slow accumulation 
of capital among merchants but at the same time nurturing 
simple commodity production. 
Only during the second stage—which took a long time to be 
reached and completed and thus occurred at widely differing 
times in different places—can the outlines of new economic 
conditions be discerned. Now towns began to win their 
autonomy from feudal overlords and evolve internally towards 
a stratified class society in which a mercantile elite pre-
dominated on the basis of wealth gathered through monopoly 
and plunder and protected by oligarchic control of gilds and 
urban governments. Merchants further consolidated their 
economic primacy as the home market expanded both in the 
cities and in the country and as foreign trade grew. Simul-
taneously, the other element of the embryonic capitalist 
bourgeoisie was emerging, formed of artisans who restricted 
access to mastership, thereby concentrating production and 
wealth in their own hands, and took over the buying and 
selling of raw materials and finished goods from their 
poorer fellows. However, as yet the bourgeoisie was ready 
—nay, eager—to compromise with feudalism. Able to purchase 
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upward mobility into the dominant classes, it accepted 
traditional social values and political structures and con-
tinued to derive its profits from purveying small amounts 
of scarce goods to the upper classes rather than bulk products 
to the masses. 
Although Dobb did not put it in such terms, the foregoing 
phases were preliminary—they engendered proto-capitalist 
elements but did not assure their triumph. The transition 
properly speaking only materialized during the third stage, 
when merchants established domestic systems and craftsmen 
reorganized production outside gild confines. The former 
acted because increasing competition lowered speculative 
profits, the latter in order to take advantage of cheap 
labor resulting from the wage-lag produced by rapid infla-
tion during the 16th century. This, then, was the critical 
phase. Yet it was not always successfully concluded: the 
development of the new mode of production could be and was 
balked. On the one hand, a "second serfdom" emerged in 
eastern Europe, in which feudal lords used wholly dependent 
labor to produce specialized agricultural commodities (prin-
cipally grain) for sale to the West, thus entering into 
capitalist exchange relations which concurrently strength-
ened feudal relations of production. On the other, in many 
places artisans used political revolt and gild regulations 
to resist the dominance of commercial capital. 
More important was the attitude of the merchants themselves: 
even when responsible for large putting-out arrangements, 
they might continue to seek their fortunes—and therefore 
make their investments—in trade and finance. For all these 
reasons, the cities of Renaissance Italy and late medieval 
Flanders and Germany never progressed beyond commercial 
capitalism.H Thus Marx's perception that artisan-founded 
manufactory was the really revolutionary source of the 
capitalist mode of production was validated historically. 
As the English experience showed, it was the entrepreneur 
risen from the ranks of the producers who was forced to 
carry through the transformation to its conclusion. In 
the process, trading monopolies had to be swept aside and 
the hegemony of merchant capital destroyed by means of 
political action. Hence England's development as the first 
capitalist nation was a direct consequence of her having 
the first bourgeois revolution. 
Beyond the rise of a capitalist class, the completion of the 
transition depended on the dual process of original accumu-
lation making all forms of capital, along with free labor 
power, available to would-be entrepreneurs. Dobb devoted 
separate chapters to the amassing of resources and the 
growth of a proletariat. As he saw it, the acquisition and 
concentration of capital involved both "the ownership of 
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assets, and ... a transfer of ownership..." (p. 178) and took 
place in two steps. 1) Purchase at low cost of "titles to 
wealth" (debt claims, bullion, land) from the old ruling 
class, aided by state banks and borrowing; from foreign 
(essentially colonial) areas, through the policies of mer-
cantilist commercial exploitation; and by the dispossession 
of small peasant and artisanal producers. 2) Realization or 
sale of these assets at higher prices in order to buy indus-
trial equipment and labor power. 
The emergence of the proletariat was the final ingredient in 
the mix which yielded capitalism. It resulted in part from 
the inherent instability of an economy of small producers— 
whether rural or urban—once political and corporate pro-
tections were weakened or removed and monopoly, usury and 
exclusiveness were allowed free rein. But as it also rep-
resented the other side of the coin of primitive accumula-
tion, it could proceed only by dispossessing a multitude of 
formerly autonomous producers. Because of these mutually 
reinforcing trends, the birth of the capitalist bourgeoisie 
necessarily meant the simultaneous birth of the proletariat. 
Much of the history of 16th and 17th century Europe—infla-
tion, political, social and religious revolt, boom and bust 
can be understood as the violent working out of the dia-
lectic accumulation/expropriation. 
The industrial revolution carried out under capitalist aus-
pices was, as it were, the synthesis, in which all the ele-
ments were fused together: unprecedented technical develop-
ment was built on the new economic and social relations 
engendered during the previous centuries. When the indus-
trial revolution gave capitalism its own specific technique 
in the form of the large mechanized factory, the transition 
was finished. 
Dobb's contributions to clarifying the transition were sub-
stantial. He provided an impressive amount of historical 
material to corroborate many of Marx's central insights. 
At the same time, he laid greater stress on the internal 
evolution of feudalism in producing the contradictions 
which led to its disintegration. Similarly, he constructed 
a more dynamic and complex view of the transition. Not only 
did he postulate several stages to the process, noting that 
it could always be arrested or diverted, but he explained 
the difficulties encountered in gathering together all the 
necessary factors of production (labor, capital, land) in 
the hands of an enterprising bourgeoisie. He gave particu-
lar attention to developments within crafts and the ways in 
which industry did--or, in many cases, did not—grow out of 
them. He urged the importance of political behavior in 
influencing the course of economic history. Finally, his 
concern for the variegated texture of the transformation led 
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Dobb to emphasize the range of outcomes which emerged his-
torically in the commercial and industrial spheres as well 
as in the agrarian sector. 
Ill 
Studies in the Development of Capitalism presented contro-
versial interpretations of a number of issues and left many 
others unresolved. As a result, although given scant notice 
by the bourgeois journals, it provoked a valuable debate 
among Marxists, in the course of which several of his points 
were clarified and others still needing attention were dis-
tinguished. The articles in which the discussion was con-
ducted for the most part initially appeared in the pages of 
Science and Society (1950, 1952, 1953). Supplemented by 
additional pieces, and excellently introduced by Rodney 
Hilton,12 they have now been collected under the title The 
Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (New Left Books/ 
Humanities Press, 1976) . -LJ A review of the key topics 
raised in these articles enables us not only to see how 
far Dobb's account can be accepted and where it must be 
corrected, but indicates the present state of Marxist 
scholarship concerning the transition. 
As we have seen, the question of what set afoot the re-
placement of one mode of production by the other has been 
problematic ever since Marx. Dobb came out firmly on the 
side of an internal contradiction, the over-exploitation 
of the labor force which triggered revolt. Paul Sweezy, 
on the contrary, relying not only on Marx but on the well-
known historian Henri Pirenne, asserted that feudalism 
was conservative and resistant to change, for in it pro-
duction was for immediate use rather than exchange. Hence 
something external--namely trade, which stimulated produc-
tion for the market--was required to unleash the forces 
which would transform it. 
This position has been losing support ever since Marx's 
time. For his part, Dobb defended his interpretation 
by reformulating it. He continued to maintain that be-
cause feudalism was a mode of production defined by 
coercive extraction of the surplus, "the basic conflict" 
was "between the direct producers and their feudal over-
lords who made exactions of their surplus labour-time or 
surplus product by dint of feudal right and fedual 
power." The end of the specific form of feudal exploita-
tion came therefore, as a result of the "revolt among the 
petty producers" (Dobb in Transition, p. 166). flowever, 
peasant struggle did not lead directly to capitalism. 
Father, it modified the dependence of petty producers on 
feudal overlordship and allowed the growth of social 
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differentiation among them. Eventually, after the drawn-out 
but thorough processes of primitive accumulation had done 
their work, capitalism was born. To be sure, this internal 
conflict interacted with trade. Yet however much commerce 
stimulated capital accumulation, commodity production and 
social stratification, it remained a secondary contradiction. 
Human agents at the point of production were necessary to 
break the pattern of feudal domination and change the rela-
tions which underlay the mode of production. By their very 
nature, exchange relations could not do this. 
Kohachiro Takahashi, in his contribution to the debate, lent 
theoretical support to Dobb by reaffirming the role of coer-
cion in getting commodities produced under feudalism, as 
against capitalism, where capital serves this mediating 
function. Hilton, drawing on his own and others' work, 
offered empirical backing to the same conclusions. He 
argued that commerce helped to accumulate money in feudal 
society but left petty-commodity production untouched. Some 
dynamic within feudalism was necessary if merchants' money 
were to be employable as capital. According to Hilton, the 
force for change resided in the dialectic of pressure on 
the part of the lord so he could maintain or improve the 
political power which alone allowed him to extract the 
surplus, and peasant opposition, which proved explosive 
and victorious towards the end of the Middle Ages. Demo-
graphic circumstances (the pressure of population on re-
sources) and the internal composition of peasant families 
played a role in the outcome of the transition, but only 
insofar as they stimulated or checked peasant revolt. Even 
the fact that success in throwing off exploitation by the 
feudal lord did not prevent a new yoke being imposed by a 
landlord, capitalist farmer or entrepreneur does not negate 
the primacy of struggle in unleashing the transformation. 
Dobb's version of the transition has been modified in sev-
eral respects. His twofold conception of original accumu-
lation has been attacked by Sweezy as empirically untenable 
—there is no evidence of the sales of assets hypothesized 
in the second part nor any class which could have bought 
them—and unnecessarily complicated, since in the first 
stage the bourgeoisie had already acquired the things it 
required in order to begin capitalist development. Other 
commentators have agreed with this criticism and Dobb him-
self has largely abandoned the formulation, acknowledging 
that his main point concerned the despoiling of laborers 
who later formed a wage-earning class. The only sense in 
which he has retained the second step is to denote a shift 
in bourgeois investment from real estate, trade, usury and 
so forth to means of production and labor. 
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The depiction of feudalism before it entered into its prolonged 
period of crisis has also come under fire for being too immo-
bile. Takahashi insisted long ago that the peasantry had begun 
to differentiate under serfdom, not merely after it had begun 
to throw off feudal constraints, as Dobb believed. A more 
comprehensive reevaluation is proposed by Hilton. As he 
writes in his introduction to the Transition book, many bour-
geois historians have narrowed the meaning of feudalism to 
cover just vassals' holding of landed fiefs from lords to 
whom they owed services, while Marxists continue to employ 
it to signify an entire mode of production in which an "en-
forced transfer, either of surplus labor or of the product 
of surplus labor" takes place (p. 14). This latter and more 
comprehensive usage is justified, Hilton asserts, as long as 
it is realized both that feudalism (including its labor form, 
serfdom) was clothes in a variety of legal and institutional 
dress, and that it was dynamic, evolving from at least the 
ninth or tenth century and passing through a number of 
stages, each marked by distinctive features and types of 
social stratification. From an early date, serfdom began 
to consist less of labor service than of money payments. 
Now this change did not itself spell the doom of feudalism, 
since coercive political relationships still underlay the 
appropriation of the surplus. But it was important because 
of what it set in motion: accumulation of money and other 
resources by peasants, nobles, merchants, usurers and crafts-
men; the tendency to treat all economic factors—including 
labor--as commodities even when production remained petty in 
scale and non-capitalist in structure; and disintegration 
of the peasantry. Despite their somewhat different emphases, 
these modifications all embody Dobb's central perception 
that feudalism decayed due to internal causes, "not as the 
result of the assault upon it of an incipient 'Capitalism' 
in the guise of 'merchant capital' wedded to 'money econo-
my'..." (Dobb in Transition, p. 100). 
Along with greater appreciation of the fact that feudalism 
was not a static closed agrarian system have come renewed 
efforts to reinterpret the place of towns, crafts and com-
merce under feudalism and in the transition, specifically 
the precise ways by which the city abetted the transforma-
tion of the country. Paul Sweezy elevated commerce to the 
status of a primary cause: the rise of the urban-centered 
market, which was fundamentally foreign to feudalism, none-
theless was necessary to change it. The market altered 
production, he maintained, prompting greater specialization, 
efficiency and division of labor, greater profits, emigra-
tion from the land. Rejecting these claims, Dobb pointed 
out that the feudal economy was not self-sufficient and 
thus needed trade which naturally stimulated production. 
But, he reiterated, commerce under feudalism could only 
encourage petty commodity production and was insufficient 
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to alter the mode of production. Dobb's explanation, however, 
still envisioned urban functions as essentially outside 
feudalism, conceived of as an agrarian system, to which 
crafts were peripheral. Interaction between city and 
country was not functionally necessary and cannot help ac-
count for the onset of the transition. 
In a recent article, included in the Transition volume, John 
Merrington has reopened the subject on the basis of the ar-
gument that towns and their activities were intrinsic to 
feudalism, not parasitic on it. Aided by monopolies re-
garding craft production and trade, he contends, productive 
forces developed within the cities. Their favored position 
—which they fought bitterly to maintain—permitted towns 
to accumulate wealth siphoned off from the rural population. 
Towns initially had a dynamic impact on feudal society; in 
the long run, however, their effects were circumscribed by 
reliance on exclusivism and restrictive practices for re-
production of the surplus. Instead of reorganizing their 
methods of fabrication and widening the market, city mer-
chants and artisans tried to cling to the gild restraints 
and market limits of petty commodity production. Never-
theless, Merrington affirms, craftsmen and traders, like 
peasants, could not avoid the process of internal differ-
entiation born of the production and exchange of commodi-
ties even on the local level, much as corporate regulations 
and municipal political institutions tried to hinder the 
process. Thus the prerequisites for capitalism in the form 
of human agents—prosperous merchants and craftsmen on the 
one hand, ruined artisans on the other—and material re-
quirements—capital and concentrated means of production— 
were slowly generated in the urban interstices of the old 
mode and as it were against its will, parallel to the 
phenomena which Dobb had described in the countryside. 
Yet these preconditions could actually serve as the ele-
ments of capitalist production only when the old restric-
tions had lost their hold, whether through circumvention 
(e.g., ignroing gild rules or moving industry to the 
countryside) or extension of the market beyond what the 
cities could effectively control. The economic activities 
conducted in and by the corporately-organized towns were 
necessary for capitalism but were not its immediate 
causes, Merrington has concluded, for in their structures 
and goals they remained too much a part of the feudal 
world. 
Other questions remain to be settled. Despite Dobb's 
attempt to give an historical basis to Marx's hypothesis 
of two routes to capitalist reorganization of production 
—mercantile and artisanal—explanations of the subject 
are not very satisfactory. Dobb himself admitted that the 
two paths are difficult to trace empirically. This is 
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particularly true since many early capitalists were hybrid 
merchant-manufacturers who carried out both production and 
commerce. In addition, many early workshops look much like 
putting-out arrangements. Marx's writings on thie point 
are also not free from ambiguity. His reading of Capital 
led Sweezy to deny that many entrepreneurs rose from the 
ranks; on the contrary, he declared, large capitalist manu-
factories in new industries had been the most innovative 
means from the very start. Merchant-run putting-out sys-
tems formed a slower, though feasible, way towards capi-
talist production, but enlarged craftsmen's workshops did 
not. In response, Dobb stuck to his original contention 
that small and parvenu types of merchant-manufacturers had 
been the most important historically. In this he was 
seconded by Takahashi, Hilton and Giuliano Procacci, al-
though the latter felt that Dobb had erred by conflating 
conservatively-managed putting-out controlled by merchants 
with small artisan-directed domestic systems which were 
the forerunners of capitalist factories. As Procacci ad-
mitted, however, there was simply not enough data to test 
his (or anyone else's) propositions. 
A quarter-century later, the matter has not been clarified 
on either the theoretical or the factual level. Our un-
derstanding both of the handicraft production which was 
carried on in towns and rural areas and of its evolution 
falls far short of what we need. It seems to fit the defi-
nition neither of feudalism nor of capitalism. This being 
so, what were its basic contradictions and how were they 
mediated and resolved? Because our empirical knowledge has 
advanced so little, the questions of what kind of capital 
actually led to capitalism, who its agents were, and 
whether it grew out of the gild economy or was a new crea-
tion remain undecided. Why the bourgeoisie changed from 
parasitical on feudalism to modernizing and entrepreneurial 
is obscure. According to Dobb, there was "a growth in the 
resources of the small man ... [and] a gradual shift of at-
tention away from purely speculative gains..." (Studies, 
p. 126); but he does not really tell us why the new atti-
tudes cropped up nor does he ground them in the political 
and social history of the period. Takahashi adopts the 
notion of a "capitalist spirit" from Max Weber; surely, 
however, this puts the cart before the horse and fails to 
reveal the reasons for the unequal distribution of the 
new spirit between greedy merchants and usurers on the 
one side and enterprising yeomen and small and medium 
industrialists on the other. We still have few studies 
about the social and professional origins of early entre-
preneurs or about the organization and functioning of 
their businesses. Even such mundane issues as the size 
of units of production, the nature of the workforce and the 
techniques involved are largely terra incognita.1^ 
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Due to its ubiquity, extensive division of labor and preco-
cious class formation and conflict, the textile craft has 
received much attention, probably too much. In fact, it 
represents just one path to capitalism, that of industries 
which were not capital-intensive and therefore allowed ar-
tisans to build up large shops with relative ease. As 
Sweezy (and earlier Marx)15 indicated, only merchants and 
landowners would have had the resources for buying labor, 
materials and means of production on the scale required 
for the new heavy industries such as mining, glassmaking, 
brewing and shipbuilding. Georges Lefebvre suggested yet 
another alternative, characterized by direct state aid to 
merchants. Not only did governments seek to establish pro-
tected markets which would aid economic growth as well as 
foster state power, but they gave grants to industry along 
with huge military contracts which called forth mass pro-
duction in order to fill them.16 
Not surprisingly in view of all the issues which remain 
open, the nature of the transition period itself continues 
to be the subject of much debate, concerning particularly 
the mode of production and the role of the state and poli-
tics during the process. Referring back to a number of 
passages in Marx and Engels, Paul Sweezy proposed to treat 
this as a distinct era in which pre-capitalist commodity 
production had undermined feudalism but had not yet en-
gendered a new mode of production. In his opinion, the 
endemic struggles of the times were caused by the attempts 
of several ruling classes—each based on a different type 
of property—to seize control of the state which, by virtue 
of the contest, was able for a long time to remain apart 
from the fray and arbitrate it. Only when the bourgeoisie 
took power (as in England after the civil wars during the 
17th century) and acquired definitive ascendancy was the 
triumph of capitalism assured. 
Supported by Procacci, who stressed that merchant capi-
talism cannot define a mode of production because it fo-
cuses on exchange, Dobb objected to any explanation of the 
transition as a separate intermediate period. Even though 
petty production existed, it continued to do so as a part 
of feudal society. As Procacci expressed it, feudalism was 
the prevalent mode of production, albeit with capitalist 
germs. While it frequently allied with merchants to do so, 
the old feudal aristocracy managed to perpetuate its sway, 
Dobb noted; thus this was a late form of feudal exploita-
tion, though now occurring in a context of centralized 
state power. In his book Lineages of the Absolutist State 
(New Left Books/Humanities Press, 1974), Perry Anderson 
comes to the same conclusion, finding that absolutism, 
the political structure which developed in the course of 
the transition, was "a redeployed and recharged apparatus 
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of feudal domination" (p. 18) rather than the political form 
of an intermediate mode. 
To be sure, all participants in the controversy agree that 
the old mode of production proved remarkably resilient. As 
Hilton has insisted, this persistence of feudal structures 
provided the economic foundation for the continuation of 
traditional relations of domination and subordination. 
Capitalism only prevailed when and where political revolu-
tion overthrew the ruling aristocracy. 
Despite the confidence with which they are made, these 
assertions far from settle these questions one way or the 
other. Even a superficial consideration of the American 
South before the Civil War or pre-industrial commodity 
production in early modern Europe and the United States 
will suffice to show that treating intermediate socio-
economic formations as wholly feudal or wholly capitalist 
tends to obscure exactly what needs to be explained, the 
transitional nature of the transition. The earlier sug-
gestions of Marx and Engels were more nuanced than many 
later and more extended analyses; they deserve to be 
looked at anew for the insights they can provide for future 
interpretations. Likewise, much remains unclear about the 
political context of the transition. Take the early bour-
geois revolutions. Did they represent the opening of the 
way to capitalism by breaking the hegemony of feudal 
classes? Or did they stand for the victory of capitalism, 
which now had but to mature? How, in short, can they help 
explain the transition? Also in need of reconsideration 
is "normal" politics: that is, the constant negotiation 
and quotidian struggle by which both the old consciousness 
and the old order were slowly altered by the human beings 
who accomplished—or prevented—the rise of capitalism. 
IV 
Two strategies for understanding the problem of the transi-
tion can be distinguished in the historical literature.17 
The first entails intensive investigation of a city or 
region over an extended period of time. While not unknown 
in the English-speaking world, such studies are the specialty 
of the informal school of historians associated with the 
French journal Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations 
and its predecessors. Notable examples are works by Pierre 
Goubert, Beauvis et le Beauvaisis de 1600 a 1730, which may 
be sampled in a synthetic article, "The French Peasantry in 
the Seventeenth Century: A Reqional Example," Past and 
Present, no. 10 (1956)^8 and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Les 
Paysans de Languedoc, a two-volume masterpiece now available 
in an abridged translation (University of Illinois Press, 
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1974)--though both can be adequately appreciated only by re-
ferring to the original texts with their extensive supporting 
documentation. Other works which testify to the concerns of 
historians working in this tradition include Pierre Deyon, 
Etude sur la societe urbaine au 17 e siecle. Amiens, capitale 
provinciale; Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine 
au XVie siecle. Lyon et ses marchands (environs de 1520-
environs de 1580); Jean Jacguart, La crise rurale en Ile-de-
France (1550-1670); Robert Boutruche, La crise d'une socieTe. 
Seigneurs et paysans du Bordelais pendant la Guerre de Cent 
Ans. These scholars and their brethren are justly respected 
for their comprehensiveness, imagination, precision, and use 
of a wide range of sources to gather an enormous amount of 
empirical data—something on which the performance of Marxist 
historians has often been inadequate. 
The interpretative framework which informs studies by Annales 
school historians is that of modernization theory. Thus they 
stress demography (which is seen as the basic factor affect-
ing supply and demand and thereby the market), technological 
development, urbanization, industrialization, and the trans-
formation of "mentalites" or worldviews, especially the emer-
gence of more "rational" attitudes. Conversely, they slight 
not only class struggle but changes in the mode of produc-
tion as well. In what is certainly the best work to have 
emerged from this tradition, Le Roy Ladurie traces a great 
agrarian cycle made up of recurrent Malthusian cycles: rising 
standard of living, increasing population, pressure on and 
parcellization of the land, subsistence crisis, population 
decline, renewed equilibrium and the recommencement of the 
same round, broken finally by the introduction of new crops 
and technology. Why these latter were ultimately adopted 
is not entirely clear but seems to rest on a changed out-
look, the source of which is obscure. In short, these 
studies have much less to say about the general issue of the 
transition as Marxists define it than about specific aspects 
of it. 
The other strategy involves rethinking the entire process, 
often from a Marxist perspective. The most exciting work 
in this field, as in the Annales-inspired studies from which 
much data is drawn, has occurred in agrarian history, whether 
to make up for earlier neglect or because of the growing 
awareness of the central importance of rural experience for 
any revolutionary transformation. In a recently published 
article,-^ Robert Brenner argues against the view that the 
transition can be interpreted by purely economic forces and 
gives a cogent critique of the prevalent demographic and 
commercial models. He maintains that these are of secondary 
consequence. Building on but extending Dobb and Hilton's 
thesis about the breakdown of feudalism, Brenner contends 
that "it is the structure of class relations, of class power, 
which will determine the manner and degree to which particu-
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lar demographic and commercial changes will affect long-run 
trends in the distribution of income and economic growth--and 
not vice versa" (p. 31), and he shows that only in this way 
can divergent outcomes be explained. 
In eastern Europe, a low level of rural solidarity and strug-
gle allowed the seigneurial reaction of the late Middle Ages 
to be victorious to such a degree that landlords felt no com-
pulsion to pursue improvements. As a further result of re-
newed aristocratic hegemony, only a small home market and 
industrial labor force came into existence, further short-
cutting the possiblity of either capitalism or industriali-
zation. In western Europe, on the contrary, peasant re-
sistance was much more effective, and it precluded the re-
imposition of serfdom. Yet in England, landlords in part-
nership with entrepreneurial-minded tenants eventually were 
able to retain control of agriculture, setting the stage 
for capitalist farming and, ultimately, self-sustaining 
industrial advance. Rather different was the upshot of 
successful peasant defiance in France, where it was asso-
ciated with the evolution of "absolute" monarchy. With 
this backing, the peasantry was able to block capitalist 
reorganization of farming but—since the state intended 
to curb though not to smash the aristocracy—could not 
achieve a decisive victory on its own terms. Thus a 
structure of petty proprietorship and traditional patterns 
of exploitation which in the long run blocked rural trans-
formation were maintained.20 
V 
Immanuel Wallerstein's Modern World-System belongs to the 
latter strategy, for it involves a reformulation of the 
transition problem. It should be said at once that the 
book is the most ambitious attempt yet to explain the 
transition by recasting the terms of the debate. Waller-
stein contends that capitalism emerged only because both 
political and economic structures were transformed, and 
therefore he has much of interest to say about the re-
ciprocal influences of economy and politics in a wide 
range of countries. In his interpretation, political 
development and economic development—or the lack of both 
—had to go hand in hand; one was not conceivable without 
the other. And in his central reformulation (from which 
the work takes its title), Wallerstein maintains that the 
transition occurred outside as well as within conventional 
frameworks, and he attempts to overcome the parochialism 
which often characterized the earlier debate. Apart from 
these considerable virtues of audacity and scope, the book 
is based on wide reading in the secondary literature, sets 
out at length its reasoning and (usually) its judgments, 
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and has a refreshingly undogmatic, even chatty, tone it 
has extensive footnotes and a most useful bibliography in 
the original edition, although the new paperback version 
eliminates them. In short, it is impossible to read the 
book and not be greatly stimulated by it. 
Because the analysis is so extensive, it needs to be sketched 
out before being critically discussed. Wallerstein begins 
by defining what he means by a world system, which he differ-
entiates from an empire. It is "an economic but not a po-
litical entity, ... larger than any juridically defined po-
litical unit," in which "the basic linkage between the parts 
of the system" is economic, later reinforced by cultural and 
political relationships (p. 15). Since there is no over-
arching political structure to maintain, the world-system 
is cheaper and more efficient than an empire, not to mention 
more flexible in responding to and benefitting from new 
initiatives.^1 Moreover, the world-system has to be organ-
ized capitalistically, for unlike feudalism, in which as we 
have seen the surplus is appropriated by political means, 
capitalism uses market mechanisms for that purpose and the 
world-system is, more than anything else, a market. Waller-
stein hastens to point out that state machinery is of course 
necessary to establish and sustain a market situation which 
redounds to the advantage of only a few of its participants, 
but the role of the state is normally indirect and economic 
relations function on their own. 
Although the entire world-system is capitalist, three divi-
sions can be distinguished within it—core, periphery and 
semiperiphery—each differing from the others accordino to 
economic, political, social and cultural factors. Accord-
ing to Wallerstein, such a system could only arise after 
the general crisis of fedualism in the later Middle Ages. 
Following Dobb and Hilton, he defines this as a period of 
long-term structural crisis due to rising political and 
social costs of an expanding ruling class which, because 
not accompanied by any increase in productivity, placed a 
greater burden on the peasantry and eventuated in general-
ized class war. But he goes further in spelling out why 
the troubles which led to the simultaneous collapse and 
rebuilding of feudalism in different parts of Europe broke 
out when they did, noting short-term or conjunctural prob-
lems: a cyclical crisis and climatological shift reinforced 
the effects of the deeper-rooted difficulties. 
Drawing largely on the Polish scholar Marian Malowist, 
Wallerstein claims that European elites were able to 
resolve the ruinous conflicts at home in such a way as 
to perpetuate their political hegemony (and, as an en-
tirely unforeseen consequence, open the way for the new 
world-system); this was accomplished by territorial and 
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commercial expansion, which greatly increased the amount of 
population and land for Europe to exploit. A further dynamic 
factor in the feudal crisis and in its resolution was the 
growth of the central state, hastened by the weakening of 
individual lords (who themselves wanted more protection than 
their own resources could provide), changes in the art of 
war, and increases in tax monies which allowed bureaucracies 
and mercenaries to be hired. States consolidated these ini-
tial advantages by the creation of legitimacy—in the form 
of an ideology which Wallerstein calls "statism" (a nice 
refinement of the overworked and, for the sixteenth century, 
incorrect term "nationalism")--and by the homogenization of 
the home population, achieved by expelling ethnic and reli-
gious minorities. Thus a powerful dialectic was set up 
within the maturing core states: monarchs wanting to restore 
order realized that they had to promote economic growth in 
order to finance their states, while the rise of strong 
government was an inescapable prerequisite to the genesis 
of capitalism, for it provided a resilient framework in 
which class formation with its inevitable conflict could 
occur without derailing economic development. 
The specific agent setting in motion the forces which 
eventually brought into existence the capitalist world-
economy was, however, neither located in the central area 
of feudalism nor was it one of the main beneficiaries of 
the new system. Rather, a special case—Portugal—opened 
the era of exploration and thereby showed the way to solve 
the feudal crisis. Portugal already had what the other 
states would acquire in the process of transition—a strong 
state, a monetized economy and relatively urbanized popula-
tion, plenty of capital, a vigorous mercantile class whose 
self-interest converged with that of the nobility—plus a 
favorable geographical position, and these were deployed 
to advantage. As a result of the initial Portuguese 
voyages and Spanish emulation, Europe was supplied with raw 
materials, food, bullion—and an equilibrating outlet for 
internal tensions. 
By means of conquest or, as in eastern Europe, commercial 
penetration, the area subject to western European economic 
or political control, or both, was enormously enlarged by 
the sixteenth century. But this circumstance led to a 
fundamental transformation only because this entire new 
"world" was organized in such a way that economic flows 
benefitted some parts more than others, thereby permitting 
the unequal accumulation of wealth necessary for economic 
development. Hence, too, political organisms of varying 
power evolved in the different regions of the world-economy: 
not all of equal strength, as that would block the inequi-
table distribution of economic goods required for capital-
ism, nor all of equal weakness, as in that case the new 
26 
capitalist classes would lack sufficient protections to 
allow them to carry out their entrepreneurial role. Yet 
it was not to happen that those states which had carried 
out political conquest would gain the upper hand and larg-
est share; as the case of China indicated, empires involved 
too many overheads which impeded growth. Portugal and Spain, 
in other words, would do the dirty work, get the glory—and 
forego the ultimate profits. Thus a new form of economic 
dominance matured. It was based partly on a new "world 
market mechanism" centered in England, the Low Countries, 
western Germany and northern France, reinforced by the 
effects of the secular inflation of the sixteenth century, 
which forced capital accumulation by the uneven realloca-
tion of profits into that same segment of northwest Europe. 
More important to the organization of new economic relations 
was an emerging worldwide division of labor. This slowly 
articulated the world-economy into three parts—core, semi-
periphery and periphery—in each of which different types 
of labor control, economic specialization and state struc-
ture obtained. Coterminous with northwest Europe, the 
core had the strongest states, able to keep order and de-
fend the economy, but not so powerful as to interfere with 
economic development by the pursuit of economically non-
functional goals which simply led to burdensome tasks. 
Whatever the variations from one to another, the core 
states had in common a greater degree of strength as com-
pared with the other areas, as a result of which the former 
got a disproportionate share of the surplus generated by 
the entire world-system. The core also specialized in 
skilled and high-profit uses of labor (crafts and industry, 
pastoral activities, the raising of certain lucrative 
crops) and employed the loosest, cheapest and most effi-
cient kinds of labor control available—wage labor and 
peasant proprietorship. The reason for this state of af-
fairs, Wallerstein contends, is not to be found in peasant 
resistance, although he does not make clear why he rejects 
this explanation (see his puzzling remarks on p. 104). In-
stead, he points to a high density of population resulting 
in cheap labor, the relative strength of towns, and the 
evolving world market, which enforced a division of labor 
and terms of trade which proved advantageous for west 
European peasants and capitalists alike. 
In the semiperiphery (never precisely defined, but appar-
ently including the Iberian peninsula, southern France, 
northern Italy, southern Germany), states were feebler, 
a process of deindustrialization and return to agrarian 
self-sufficiency was occurring, and sharecropping—a sort 
of second-best way of minimizing risks in a period of 
inflation—was adopted. In this segment—substantially 
the Hapsburg empire of Charles V and his successors— 
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monarchs chased after imperial dreams, thus getting in the 
way of nascent capitalism, for which they could open the way 
and pay the costs but not reap the rewards. 
Finally, in the periphery governments were extremely weak, 
often no more than adjuncts of west European regimes, whose 
interests they served either under direct compulsion or due 
to the workings of the world market. Though this arrangement 
bolstered the narrow political elite of the peripheral lands, 
it spelled ever-growing misery for the mass of the population. 
This area provided bullion for the money and capital western 
Europe needed, as well as exotic foods and materials (Latin 
America) and bulky raw materials and grain (eastern Europe), 
all of which allowed more remunerative specialization in the 
core.22 For this to be possible, of course, these commodities 
had to be produced cheaply by means of unskilled labor power. 
Hence harsh methods of organization were required, whether 
slavery or serfdom, which together Wallerstein calls "coerced 
cash-crop labor."23 
As even this bare summary indicates, Wallerstein's book pro-
vides a provocative thesis with which to interpret the tran-
sition. It attempts to give theoretical as well as histori-
cal content to Marx's comment (Capital, I, ch. IV) that "The 
modern history of capital dates from the creation in the 
sixteenth century of a world-embracing commerce and a world-
embracing market." Synthesizing earlier work, Wallerstein 
presents a nuanced view of feudalism, describing how trade 
was intrinsic to it, and of its final crisis. Even more 
than Dobb, he stresses the many differences as well as the 
similarities in capitalist economic development. Likewise, 
his treatment of the evolution of the state in western 
Europe during the transition goes well beyond anything in 
the earlier literature. 
Notwithstanding these accomplishments, the work has a number 
of deficiencies. Some are to be expected in light of its 
impressive reach, and affect only matters of detail and 
emphasis. But there are several which strike at the heart 
of its argument and which therefore deserve to be examined 
at some length: the categories Wallerstein employs, his 
definition of capitalism, and a strongly ahistorical ten-
dency in the book's thesis and presentation. In each of 
these closely linked cases, there are problems both with 
the basic conception and with the fit between the theoreti-
cal framework and the data marshalled in support of it. 
Very likely this difficulty in pinning down the proof of 
the points advanced in the book is what makes reading it 
so often frustrating. 
1. Categories. Although it has a certain elegance as a 
hypothesis, the tripartite model of the world-economy does 
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not work very well. The importance of the dialectic between 
development and underdevelopment in capitalism, first noted 
by Marx and elaborated by Andre Gunder Frank (on whom Waller-
stein draws), has been well documented. The phenomenon was 
not, indeed, limited to relations between emerging capitalist 
nations and colonized areas. Even within the capitalist land 
a trend towards specialization originated at least as early 
as the sixteenth century, with the result that each ended up 
by reproducing domestically the overall pattern of advanced 
and backward areas. But if the interdependence of periphery 
(no matter where located geographically) and core in the 
capitalist economy can be accepted as proven, its application 
by Wallerstein to the historical material cannot be endorsed 
without significant exception. The formation of advanced 
and backward regions was not, to begin with, simply a func-
tion of the world-system, being found within the capitalist 
core as well as between it and the periphery. Perhaps this 
fact explains why the world-system is invoked in this book 
as both cause and effect of the emerging worldwide division 
of labor. Nor was the trend to specialization very far 
advanced in the sixteenth century: even the periphery re-
mained largely outside the world-system and contributed more 
supply than demand. 
Further, the discussion of the core itself is confusing. As 
it stands, this area includes a number of lands at the end 
of the Middle Ages (most of northwest Europe and even some 
of Germany and Italy) but only England by the later seven-
teenth century. While this corresponds with the history of 
capitalism, just England and to a lesser degree France get 
much attention for their success and near-miss respectively; 
the other areas simply disappear. This is rather surprising, 
given Wallerstein's stress elsewhere on the significance of 
the Netherlands. But instead of an explanation for the 
Netherlands' failure to remain one of the core states, we 
are merely told that she eventually got pushed out of the 
market (p. 214), something which appears to be more a 
result than a cause of other developments. Even less is 
indicated about the fate of the other regions. Hence the 
potentially exciting subject of the formation of a capi-
talist core in western Europe comes down to the old topic 
of why England became the first capitalist nation even 
though France had seemed the most likely candidate. And 
as we shall see, the explication offered—success in 
dominating the world market—is unsatisfactory. In any case, 
the discussion of the core needs to be broadened, to make 
provision for a greater variety of outcomes and for the 
stages of the transition which would explain these results. 
After all, capitalism was built in different ways and at 
different rates of speed. 
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Wallerstein's refinement of the core-periphery model is, 
moreover, open to serious objection, for the notion of the 
semiperiphery which he introduces is unpersuasive both con-
ceptually and empirically. It works neither as an analytic 
nor as a descriptive category. Basically, he assigns the 
semipheriphery the task of providing a dynamic dimension to 
the rather static core-periphery polarization (which once 
it is insituted in the sixteenth century continues right up 
to the present) without having recourse to the idea of 
stages or phases of development: the semiperiphery is made 
up of rising former peripheral areas and declining core 
states. Despite disclaimers (pp. 349-50), the semiperiph-
ery seems little more than a post-hoc catch-all for odd 
cases, especially those disconcerting parts of Europe which 
did not break through to capitalism although they had capi-
tal, skills and industry (Italy), or land and labor (Spain), 
or all of these and more (Portugal). Creating this sort of 
holding basin serves, however, to obscure not illuminate 
the internal dynamics of the world-system. 
Nor is any other function of the semiperiphery advanced by 
Wallerstein convincing. He further defines it as a mediator, 
where "vital skills that are often politically unpopular" 
were collected (p. 350). Even if we overlook the vagueness 
of this explanation, are we really to believe that entre-
preneurship and business skills, which were matured in 
semiperipheral Italy, were actually politically unpopular 
in the Netherlands? Or that state-formation, which the 
Spanish government pursued relentlessly, was not also to the 
taste of that Henry VIII who referred to himself as "emperor 
in his own realm"? Similarly, it is hard to understand the 
place of the semiperiphery in the international division 
of labor. Its separate conceptual existence could be jus-
tified if it had a special role. Yet if, as Wallerstein 
claims, it were actually taking the route of deindustriali-
zation and agrarian self-sufficiency, it was economically 
external to the world-economy; if not, it was providing 
core and/or peripheral goods and services and need not be 
treated separately. 
Other evidence also indicates the incoherent nature of the 
semiperiphery. For one thing, the units within it were ex-
tremely heterogeneous—which is perhaps why we never get a 
concrete definition of what composed it: parts of France 
and Germany, Italy, Spain, presumably Portugal. Then, too, 
it is by no means plain that all the places Wallerstein 
puts in the semiperiphery were turning to self-sufficiency. 
Not only were there large capitalist farms throughout, but 
sharecropping itself was capitalistic, as at least one of 
Wallerstein's authorities remarks (see p. 107, n. 148), and 
was not limited to semiperipheral regions (see p. 105, 
n. 141). 
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In dealing with France, that hybrid of core and semiperiphery, 
the problems with the latter emerge directly. By pointing to 
her schizophrenia--a state at once too strong and too weak, 
an orientation to land and to sea, and so forth--Wallerstein 
reminds us of the curious blend of immobilism and action 
which was the French absolutist state. However, these con-
tradictions within France had little to do with emerging 
semiperipheral factors; instead, they resulted from the con-
tinued regionalism of economic and political structures, a 
point which even Wallerstein comes close to conceding (see 
p. 294). Regional disparities were emphasized by the un-
equal development inherent in capitalism, but they had prior 
causes; besides, internal variations were powerfully rein-
forced by popular movements all across the late medieval 
and early modern periods, ranging from peasant risings to 
less dramatic action in town and country. Since Wallerstein 
regards these as results of France's position rather than 
as central causes, he ends up explaining hybrid and vacil-
lating behavior as a result of its hybrid and vacillating 
position in the world-economy. Unfortunately, this sort 
of circular argument functions no better here than in re-
gard to the formation of the world-system and its division 
of labor. Finally, the areas of southern France which 
Wallerstein treats as semiperipheral from an economic point 
of view turn out to be the allies of core provinces on the 
Atlantic coast when political movements are discussed. In 
the case of France, semiperiphery serves no explanatory 
purpose; it just confuses the issue. 
It might be thought that a better case could be made for 
semiperiphery if it were restricted to the Hapsburg terri-
tories. Yet even here it is both distorting and super-
fluous. For one thing, in important parts of that terri-
tory capitalism did in fact flourish: not only in the 
Rhineland but also in Catalonia, as Pierre Vilar has shown. 
In addition, Wallerstein himself focuses on the Hapsburg 
lands as demonstrating how political factors—in the event, 
imperial "overextension"—could undermine economic develop-
ment. Like France, therefore, much of Spain, Italy and 
Germany (not to mention Portugal and the Netherlands), can 
more sensibly be discussed as countries which despite 
numerous advantages were unable to complete the transition. 
Such an explanantion would avoid the logical dilemma of 
using position in the world-system to account for position 
in the world-system, as Wallerstein is repeatedly forced to 
do in order to make his theory work. It would as well in-
corporate dynamic elements directly into the core-periphery 
dialectic, both in terms of the evolution of capitalism 
(something Wallerstein ignores) and in terms of the regional 
variations which were endemic throughout Europe before and 
after the transition or its failure. On the whole, then, 
the semiperiphery is unnecessary; in terms of economic 
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development, political organization and social structure, its 
constituent parts were rather strata of the two basic struc-
tural components of the world-system than a separate class. 
2. Definition of Capitalism. Wallerstein's account of the 
origins of the "world-embracing" market which Marx had re-
marked on is also disappointing. His interpretation of the 
history of overseas expansion is in the end puzzling, fas-
cinating as his explanation of many individual features is. 
Portugal, we are told, led off because she had largely sur-
mounted her feudal crisis and therefore enjoyed distinctive 
attributes. However, the central reasons adduced for her 
voyaging seem contingent (need for spices, Genoese capital) 
or fortuitous (geographic position, internal class harmony), 
while Europe's problems were structural, rooted in the mode 
of production. In short, as Wallerstein himself admits 
(p. 48), it is difficult to link the circumstances of Por-
tuguese exploration with Europe's general crisis. To put 
it another way, there is no real reason why Portugal should 
have ventured forth in order to solve those European prob-
lems she did not have. It is also hard to understand why 
Spain rather than another country followed and then replaced 
Portugal in expansion, since Spain does not seem to have met 
the criteria for success in this endeavor—social solidarity 
at home and the ability to use distant cheap labor (p. 8 6 ) — 
any better than anyone else. In The Modern World System, 
expansion functions as a deus ex machina. 
But Wallerstein's emphasis on the vast growth of the Euro-
pean-centered economic system does not derive simply from 
his reading of the history of exploration and therefore 
cannot be refuted just by showing the incoherence of this 
part of his account. He asserts as well that expansion 
promoted a new pattern of specialization and new forms of 
labor control which assured that the surplus flowed mainly 
into the core. While booty was of some consequence in this 
process, the crucial factor was a sharp rise in prices dur-
ing the sixteenth century, the effect of an influx of gold 
and silver from the New World "in the context of a capi-
talist world-economy..." (p. 74). Together with a related 
wage lag, inflation distributed income inequitably, forcing 
savings and thus investment. 
Although the phenomena he describes were both real and 
important, Wallerstein*s explanation and application of 
them is unconvincing. First, he relies heavily (though 
somewhat unclearly) on the work of the economic historian 
Earl Hamilton, whose data as well as conclusions have been 
largely modified, when not rejected, by later research.24 
Moreover, once again Wallerstein begs the question by as-
suming the existence of a capitalist world-system when he 
is trying to discover its origins. Further, we are never 
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shown whether the wealth generated was in fact either trans-
ferred from some groups and parts of the world-economy to 
others. Most important, the information he presents (see 
pp. 69-84, especially Table I) strongly suggests that bul-
lion was of minor significance in setting off inflation. 
Rather, it was rising economic activity in the context of 
the expropriation of direct producers who were forced into 
the market which explains both inflation and the fall in 
wages. Bullion could have effects, in other words, only 
because the artisans and peasants of Europe were being 
dispossessed. In short, Wallerstein focuses on the gath-
ering of money,while neglecting the process of primitive 
accumulation which alone reveals how the conditions de-
veloped which permitted money to function as capital. 
The difficulties with Wallerstein's exposition of the genesis 
of capitalism arise in part from his interpretation of the 
historical material. Over and above this, they come from his 
understanding of capitalism. As we have seen, capitalism is 
a unique system of production and appropriation of the sur-
plus produced. It is not, as Marx long ago pointed out (and 
Dobb patiently restated in chapter 1 of Studies), a system 
of exchange, even though the circulation of commodities is 
intrinsic to it. For Wallerstein, however, what matters 
are market regulations. Repeating and defending Gunder 
Frank, he sees "capitalism as production for market in which 
the profit does not go to the direct producer..." (p. 126). 
There is no doubt that the market is important in the evolu-
tion and structure of capitalism. It promotes the develop-
ment of productive forces as well as differentiation among 
producers, thereby permitting the continued reproduction of 
capitalist relations. It is the place where labor power 
is purchased, where other commodities ciculate, and where 
surplus value is realized and then appropriated to the 
advantage of one class and the detriment of another. Its 
workings augment the amount of money available for invest-
ment, as is evident from the fact that merchants were among 
the first to accumulate and deploy capital on a large scale. 
But if the market can do all this, it alone cannot begin the 
process of bringing capitalism into existence, as we have 
seen. After all, the exchange of commodities existed under 
feudalism; while the volume of exchanges increases under 
capitalism, the capitalist market is not a new development 
in the sense that capitalist production is, as is clear 
when we recall that the "commercial revolution" occurred 
during the High Middle Ages.25 Moreover, since medieval 
trade yielded high profits (and thus an unequal accumula-
tion of capital) to the lands of the Mediterranean and 
further east without engendering capitalism, we should be 
wary of attributing too much weight to this mechanism in 
early modern western Europe. 
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In any case, the markets which mattered to the sustenance of 
early capitalist development were less those newly opened by 
recent exploration and settlement than those within western 
Europe. De Vries' study of Holland reveals that agrarian 
reorganization was a function not of distant world but of 
nearby markets. Economic growth ensued because of regional 
specialization and rationalization, not to mention changes 
within village and family structure. In the case of England, 
too, the trade patterns which fostered rural industry and 
capitalist agriculture were interregional or with the Conti-
nent; they had little to do with the new world market until 
well into the seventeenth century. Even the evidence cited 
by Wallerstein supports the point that it was not the re-
cently-opened areas of the world which helped English com-
merce and industry grow, but the old.26 
While as Wallerstein notes (p. 129), Marx did write that "the 
capitalistic era dates from the sicteenth century" (Capital, 
I, ch. XXVI), this was not done to demonstrate the existence 
of a world-economy. Instead, the assertion was made in the 
context of a discussion of original accumulation, which 
forced people to enter the market, to produce for it and to 
buy in it. Wallerstein rightly sees the market as a place 
for amassing capital, but he disregards those aspects which 
were equally central to capitalism: the enforced sale of 
labor power and the circulation of commodities made under 
the new relations of production. 
Once it is grasped that the results of primitive accumulation 
created the world market rather than the other way around, 
it becomes possible to make sense of two related matters 
which are confused in Wallerstein's presentation. First, 
the fact that territorial and commercial expansion during 
the sixteenth century—unlike that which had occurred in 
the ninth and tenth and again in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries—did not revitalize feudalism but marked its de-
mise. Second, his treatment of the second serfdom in the 
East as an offshoot of trade, despite evidence that the 
market led to the abolition of serfdom in many places.27 In 
short, as these and other examples indicate—Spain's abortive 
development is a particularly outstanding instance—the mar-
ket was a variable which had different effects depending 
on what Marx called the "internal articulation" of the ex-
isting economic structure. 
To be sure, Wallerstein is aware that a labor force is re-
quired by any mode of production; one of his central--and 
most interesting—theses concerns the several forms of con-
trol devised under capitalism to manaqe labor. In order 
to explain these differences, he relies on demography. 
Thus a higher density of population in the core countries 
led to greater specialization and productivity, which in 
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turn meant workers were more amenable to market discipline 
and required less coercion than in the less populous periph-
ery and semiperiphery. This reasoning seems, however, to 
undercut his argument about the effects of the expanded mar-
ket: if demographic factors affected economic evolution even 
before the world-system came into existence, then the latter 
seems to serve no explanatory purpose. Aside from this, em-
phasis on population underplays the role of social conflict 
not only in bringing about change but in determining rela-
tions of production, which at bottom is what labor control 
is all about. Wallerstein explains commu tation of feudal 
dues to money rents during the crisis of the later Middle 
Ages in terms of population decline rather than class 
struggle. Or, as he puts his general conclusion about 
variations in forms of labor control, "The difference [in 
types of labor regimentation] was less in the peasant's 
alternatives, though this played a role, than in the land-
owner's alternatives" (p. 111). Most important of all, a 
stress on population movements can explain quantitative 
change within a given structure, as the monographs of the 
Annales school have shown, but only an explication of the 
way contradictions within a mode of production were worked 
out can account for its supercession. 
Attention must be given, that is to say, to the interplay 
between changing market forces and the conflicts within the 
existing socio-economic structure. Then several of the 
intriguing but unanswered questions raised at least im-
plicitly by Wallerstein's book could be resolved. For 
example, why did Portugal not develop capitalistically, 
endowed as she was with a strong but not oppressive state, 
cooperating bourgeoisie and nobility, a relatively high 
degree of urbanization, plentiful but not disorderly semi-
proletariat, a lot of capital, and first position in the 
scramble? An even more notable anomaly which could be 
cleared up is that the countries in which the feudal crisis 
was strongest—e.g., England and France—did not get into 
the business of expansion for a long time after the Iberian 
nations had shown the way. England and France, of course, 
were also the countries which later formed the capitalist 
core. 
Pace Wallerstein, then, there is no proof that it was a 
market capitalism born of commercial and demographic ex-
pansion which allowed Europe to get out of "decimation 
and stagnation." On the contrary, it seems that capital-
ism only developed where "old" and "new" forces had no 
choice but to contend with one another until the latter 
won out. In England, class struggle continued until the 
victory of proto-capitalist landlords and entrepreneurs; 
in France, strife continued as a result of social dead-
lock; in Spain, feudal groups won. Initial deep 
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involvement in the emerging world-system was a hindrance to 
economic progress rather than a help. Those areas which ac-
tually had subjected parts of the periphery which they could 
exploit did not evolve in a capitalist direction because they 
were not thrust in upon themselves and forced to. If expan-
sion were a viable option, the struggle at home was decided 
in favor of the dominant feudal groups, but economic trans-
formation was precluded. 
3. Ahistorical Theory and Presentation. In order to incor-
porate the dialectic between the market and social relations 
into his explanation of the rise of capitalism, Wallerstein 
would have to do more than pay closer attention to the pro-
ductive aspect of the economy, to the contradictions born 
within it and to the structure and evolution of commodity 
production. Aided by the growing corpus of detailed local 
studies, which are for the most part ignored in The Modern 
World-System, he would have to cast his investigation in 
historical terms. This means first of all recognizing that 
capitalism and its core-periphery dichotomy were historical 
developments which had barely begun in the early modern 
period. At that time, most of both areas was entirely 
outside of the still-rudimentary world system and not sub-
ject to its exigencies. Even in those portions which were 
affected by new economic conditions, traditional modes of 
production, classes and forms of behavior persisted for 
centuries. 
Just as it has been shown that treating feudalism as a mono-
lith makes it impossible to comprehend its adaptations and 
collapse, so capitalism cannot be understood if its evolving 
phases are overlooked. Specifically, an early mercantile 
stage needs to be distinguished from a later industrial one. 
In the first—which is in fact the subject of Wallerstein's 
book--capital played a much larger role than before; how-
ever, neither the relations nor the forces of production 
had changed much. Even though they increasingly set the 
terms, merchants still bought from petty producers, who on 
their side continued to work in the old ways and enjoyed 
many traditional privileges and protections. Even artisan-
run workships were small and required the physical labor of 
the owner if they were to provide him a living. This phase 
was transitional in the truest sense of the word: economic 
development could and did go forward and back. Capitalism's 
victory was not assured anywhere. 
If anything else, his reading of the transition debate should 
have indicated to Wallerstein that while the system he out-
lines was not feudal, neither was it yet capitalist. Unfor-
tunately, the static way in which he regards economic forma-
tions causes him to miss the opportunity to redefine the 
transition in a manner which would go beyond the either-or 
terms of earlier contributions. 
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Were Wallerstein's explication historical--if, in other words, 
it interpreted the economic structure of the sixteenth century 
for what it was (a transitional term) rather than for what it 
might become (a fully developed mode of production)--a number 
of outstanding issues could begin to be elucidated. Take the 
surprising economic history of the Netherlands, which showed 
a type of evolution within the early core states which fell 
short of self-sustaining industrial capitalism. Even with a 
strong but flexible state in which the bourgeoisie was hege-
monic, nearly free access to the empires created by the 
Iberian nations, first-rate technique, among many other ad-
vantages, the Netherlands only rose to temporary commercial 
predominance: it did not complete the economic transformation 
until much later. Besides throwing light oh this and other 
examples of commercial growth without capitalist development, 
an historical interpretation could suggest answers to the 
many remaining questions about labor organization. For ex-
ample, the core employed both wage labor and peasant pro-
prietorship. Yet these are very different forms of labor 
organization, and accounting for their success (vide Bren-
ner) goes a long way towards solving the puzzle of why.Britain 
took off first and France stumbled. Then, too, the way that 
eastern Europe was incorporated into the periphery might be 
rescued from the logical and historical circularity to which 
Wallerstein has consigned it. As he tells the story, the 
outcome seems to depend on the existence of the world economy 
and its division of labor, to the building of which, however, 
eastern Europe's coerced cash-crop labor was a primary con-
tributor. Finally, the insuperable confusion engendered by 
the concept of the semiperiphery would vanish if its com-
ponent parts were seen not as part of a system which was 
completely articulated from its day of birth but as going 
thorugh stages--whether progressive or regressive—of the 
transition. 
Greater regard to both the historical dimension and the 
inner dynamics of the transition would illuminate its po-
litical context. The formation of strong national states 
and economic development is a point on which Wallerstein 
understandably lays great stress: "The capitalist world-
economy seems to have required and facilitated this secular 
process of increased centralization and internal control, 
at least within the core states" (p. 136). Upon considera-
tion, however, the validity of this insight is not at all 
apparent, and in fact the entire discussion of the rela-
tionship between economic and political evolution is most 
inadequate. At root, of course, the arqument is circular: 
economic growth was required for the emergence of a strong 
state machinery, which in turn was necessary if capitalism 
were to arise. Even if we disregard this recurrent logical 
problem, empirical ones remain. Except for homogem?ation 
of population, the features of the new state spelled out in 
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chapter 3 are not made specific to particular states. All 
we know is that "some kings" implemented them. Moreover, the 
state-building described does not fit merely, or even best, 
the core countries. It applies to Spain, some of the Italian 
princedoms, and parts of Germany as well as to England and 
France, and better to all of them than to the Netherlands. 
Furthermore, it was not. the case that Waller stein' s core 
states were the strongest either internationally or in the 
face of internal opposition, his criteria for a powerful 
state (p. 355). Indeed, as he elsewhere suggests, England 
and the Netherlands had governments which were not so force-
ful or expensive as to thwart economic development, though 
otherwise they were extremely different, It should also be 
remembered that in England prolonged revolution broke out. 
The most disappointing aspect of this part of his discussion 
is Wallerstein's narrow view of early modern politics. To 
be sure, the activities of monarchs and established landed 
elites were important, but they were only half the dialectic. 
Regarding politics from the top down, as in this book, implie 
that policies finally implemented derived from well-planned 
rational decisions, thereby distorting the interaction of 
historical forces, notably class struggle, by ignoring them. 
To take just one instance: due to his concentration on the 
nobility and its concerns, Wallerstein overlooks the central 
dynamic of the Netherlands Revolution, the vacillating be-
havior of the various strata of the bourgeoisie and arti-
sans. 28 AS a further consequence of his restrictive notion 
of politics, the significance of the new Dutch republic for 
European economic and political development'is disregarded 
or, rather, relegated to a quotation in a footnote. In this 
book, discussion of "state-building" substitutes for politi-
cal analysis. 
The scope of Wallerstein's inquiry is broader, but in the 
end his treatment of the genesis of capitalism gets us no 
further than Dobb and the earlier transition debate. In-
deed, Wallerstein's explanation of the issues of peasant 
struggle, petty commodity production, urban-rural relations, 
and primitive accumulation is inferior to the level achieved 
in previous contributions. He discusses the final crisis 
of feudalism, but since he wants to define the rise of a 
world-system, not a mode of production, he addresses himself 
not to contradictions but to trade, to demography, to the 
calculating behavior of the political elite. His mentor 
is not Karl Marx, the student of class struggle, but Fernand 
Braudel, the Annales-school patriarch of biologically and 
geographically determined modernization. 
What Wallerstein has done is to describe the formation of a 
greatly enlarged trading unit; he shows the transition from 
one market system to another. Hence the importance of Am-
sterdam: not because it had any effect on expansion, labor 
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control, or state formation, but because it served as the 
center of world trade. Yet as the rapid elimination of 
Amsterdam (or, for that matter, Antwerp) from the leading 
position showed, being the keystone of even the biggest 
commercial arena meant little when not backed up by do-
mestic structural change. The world system outlined by 
Wallerstein was a commercial network, more sizeable than 
but not yet fundamentally different from earlier world sys-
tems found around the Mediterranean and in northern Europe. 
Eventually, it was transformed into a capitalist economy 
firmly dominated by a small number of western European 
nations. But while the system created the periphery and 
its peculiar relations with the core, it did not create 
capitalism in the core states. That was the result of the 
interaction between the market and internal developments. 
The modern capitalist world-system was the child not the 
parent of European capitalism. 
TROM EOCCACCIO, r>r CLARIS MULIERIEUS. (I-LM, JOMAN.N ZAINER, 1473.) 
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